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Sociology and Climate Change
after Kyoto
What Roles for Social Science in Understanding
Climate Change?
Steven Yearley
University of Edinburgh, UK
abstract: This article focuses on the comparatively neglected role of the social
sciences (including economics) and of assumptions about the social functioning of
the scientific community in projections about climate change and about societies’
responses to changing climates and related environmental phenomena. Using an
approach informed by social constructionism and science and technology studies,
it examines the part played by the social sciences and the social institutions of
science in making knowledge about the future of humankind in relation to the
changing ecosphere. Using a small series of case studies focused on the way that
social science features in the shaping of climate knowledge – for example, how
value is attached to economic activities in different countries in the course of
attempts to calculate the most ‘rational’ global response to the myriad threats of
changing climates – the article shows that there is a need for (1) greater under-
standing of the social dimensions of the scientific community that studies climate
change and (2) more social science reflection on the roles of social science in
climate-change models and projections.
keywords: adaptation  climate change  judgement  peer review  social
construction
Introduction: Global Warming and
Humanly Induced Climate Change
In June 2007, international headlines were taken up with the story that
China’s annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions had, for the first time, sur-
passed those of the USA. A small decline in US emissions, associated with
Current Sociology  May 2009  Vol. 57(3): 389–405
© International Sociological Association
SAGE (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC)
DOI: 10.1177/0011392108101589
CS
Current Sociology Vol. 57 No. 3
390
a downturn in economic growth, combined with continuing expansion of
China’s use of coal-burning power stations and a further leap forward in
its cement production led the Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency (Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau; MNP) to estimate that, in 2006,
China’s emissions had exceeded those of the US by around 8 percent. The
surprise was not that China’s CO2 emissions should one day overtake
those of the US; such an eventuality had been predicted for several years.
What was startling, according to the MNP,1 was that China had risen to
world-leading emitter so quickly and by such a significant margin.
Climate analysts feared that this rapid rise in emissions would mean that
forecast climate changes might come about more quickly than had been
anticipated or even that atmospheric CO2 levels might reach new, higher
peaks before atmospheric greenhouse gas levels could be stabilized; in
turn, this would leave policy-makers less time than had been assumed to
respond to global warming and to reach international agreements.
The importance of this story for the present article is that it shows – in
a simple but also dramatic way – that the business of predicting green-
house emissions, climate futures and policy responses is critically
dependent on social variables such as the choice of technology, regional
development policies, consumers’ behaviour and the performance of the
economy. I argue that the focus of analyses of the debate over climate
change has – understandably – been fixed on the natural scientific aspects
of the issue as represented in models of the climate, oceans and atmos-
phere operated by scientists associated with the IPCC (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change) and others. In many ways, these aspects have
been the more epistemologically and technologically interesting ones, but
it has often been the case that the social science side of the equation
(including social scientific assumptions about how scientific institutions
operate) has outweighed in its implications the natural science side. This
orientation has led to a neglect of the importance of the ways that eco-
nomic and social scientific aspects of global warming have entered into
the business of forecasting, understanding and trying to manage the
changing climate. I thus propose to set out and exemplify the case for
refocusing attention onto the social science aspects of climate change.
The ‘Constructedness’ of Climate Change
Despite the long history of arguments about the utility of viewing envi-
ronmental problems as ‘constructed’ (Murphy, 1995; Yearley, 1991, 2005a),
there is a simple sense in which knowledge about climate change and
specifically about the future climate is undeniably (and uncontroversially)
constructed. First, it is constructed in the sense that it is a projection about
the future behaviour of an enormously complex system about which,
everyone agrees, there is imperfect knowledge. Accordingly, scientists and
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modellers are obliged to try to estimate the future behaviour of a system
without knowing all the variables in play. Some insight into these efforts is
available from Lahsen, who has helpfully carried out ethnographic work
on the climate modelling community, examining how the models (known
as GCMs or general circulation models) gain credibility (Lahsen, 2005b; see
also Bloomfield, 1986; Sundberg, 2005: 166–84). By their nature, such mod-
els cannot be tested against the future since we cannot wait for the future
to arrive before making decisions about whether today’s models are right.
Nor can they really be adequately tested against data about past climates
since they are constructed precisely in the light of information about the
past and thus are more likely to be accurate under past circumstances than
unprecedented new ones (see Edwards, 2000: 232). Accordingly, the mod-
els are inevitably to some extent conjectural. This perception is also wide-
spread within the modelling community, as one of Lahsen’s respondents
states: ‘As atmospheric scientist Kevin Trenberth has noted, “All models
are of course wrong because, by design, they depict a simplified view of
the system being modeled” ’ (Lahsen, 2005b: 919, citing Trenberth, 1997).
One way to test the models is therefore to run them against each other;
Lahsen tracks how modellers manage the tension between their concep-
tions of the real word and the modelled world. There are also practical con-
straints on modelling; it remains very time-consuming and expensive:
‘Despite vast increases in computer power, full runs of today’s state-of-the-
art GCMs still require hundreds of supercomputer hours, since modelers
add complexity to the models even more rapidly than computers improve’
(Edwards, 2000: 232; see also Edwards, 1996).
Given that the climate science community is not homogeneous,
Shackley (2001) argues for the existence of contrasting ‘epistemic lifestyles’
within the modelling community. Some modellers are concerned with
developing the most comprehensive model they can, arguing that this is a
necessary route to meaningful climate prediction. Others are concerned to
establish as quickly as possible models capable of addressing general long-
term trends so that projections can be made and fed into the policy process
(see also Sundberg, 2005: 136–7). The latter group has tended to be domi-
nated by thermodynamicists who argue that the climate system can be
treated as a black-box exchanging energy with the rest of the universe.
With different ambitions for their models and different views of the most
important task at hand, these analysts literally construct their models
differently.
A second way in which climate projections are constructions is that they
depend on assumptions about what people and governments, corpora-
tions and householders will do. Just as climate models require simplified
versions of the atmosphere and the oceans, climate projections demand
simplified versions of societal activity. The key point here is that people’s
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behaviour is by no means fully separable from the business of the GCMs.
It is not as though there is a separate carbon system and a distinct social
system; social systems can relate directly to various climate-change mech-
anisms. Growth in aviation, for example, will not only add more carbon to
the atmosphere but may stimulate the development of cirrus clouds and
other phenomena associated with the ‘contrails’ from plane engines. Social
choices affect climate futures in complicated ways. This second aspect of
construction has an additional level of complexity since the behaviours of
governments, consumers and other actors will be affected by the various
climate-change projections produced (by the IPCC, climate sceptics, pres-
sure groups and others) and how well publicized and persuasive the
experts’ views are. For this reason, the futures produced by the IPCC and
other modellers are not to be regarded as forecasts of what will happen (in
the way that an ordinary weather forecast is an estimate of what tomor-
row’s weather will be). They are consciously offered as estimates of what
would be expected to happen given certain circumstances. Most impor-
tantly, if governments, corporations and consumers pay attention to those
calculations, then the circumstances will change and the ‘forecast future’
will never come. It was this thinking that led the IPCC to move away from
something like predictions (which it issued in the 1990s) to numerous pos-
sible scenarios for its Third Assessment Report (in 2001); the range of sce-
narios reflected the range of societal and technical responses as well as the
range of acknowledged uncertainties within the climate science.
There is a third distinct sense in which climate-change projections are
constructed and that has to do with the design and constitution of the insti-
tutions within which the projections are legitimately generated. Models in
this area are not produced by lone academics; modelling capacity is highly
expensive and projections are produced in relatively small numbers in a
few centres worldwide. The results are agreed through an elaborate
process of negotiation within the IPCC and, though academics may write
up their results in numerous journals and other outlets, the most main-
stream publications are the IPCC reports. These result from a hybrid
process of scientific discussion and diplomatic negotiation where country
representatives have a large say in writing chapter summaries. Given the
interests at stake and the importance of trying to achieve an international
consensus, this is no doubt sensible. However, it does mean that who gets
to write the results, what is presented and how it is summarized are all
things regulated in a different way from the standard academic model. The
fact that climate science and authoritative climate projections have come to
be organized in this way is itself an element of its construction – a con-
struction at the level of the sociology of the scientific community.
To conclude this introductory section, I propose that in specific and demon-
strable ways claims about climate change are clearly a ‘social construction’.
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This is not to say that they are fictions, mere conventions or conclusions
arrived at in tendentious ways. In this area there can only be constructions.
But there are social scientifically interesting questions about the precise ways
in which such knowledge has been socially constructed. Let us now turn to
the reasons why the first of these three sense of construction has tended to
predominate in the literature on climate change.
Identifying ‘Construction’ in the
Natural Science of Climate Science
At least two factors appear to have encouraged commentators interested
in the generation of knowledge about climate change to focus principally
on its natural scientific aspects (on construction in the first sense above).
There is first the fact that such a major scientific initiative is founded on
models and simulations run on enormously powerful and expensive com-
puters. Of course, the study of climate records – human records and ice
cores – and the analysis of possible mechanisms for warming and temper-
ature regulation are important too, but the models seem to capture much
of what is distinctive in this effort. Second, there is the sheer complication
of the science and the sheer diversity of the information that needs to
brought to bear, making this a highly interdisciplinary endeavour.
Mention has already been made of the work of Edwards and Lahsen. A
series of papers by Shackley and Wynne (1995, 1996) provide further
examples since they examine how modelled knowledge is produced,
made credible and rendered serviceable for the policy community (see also
Shackley et al., 1998, 1999). Thus, writing with two Dutch colleagues (van
der Sluijs et al., 1998), they investigated the strikingly consistent nature of
estimates of climate sensitivity over a series of models and policy reviews.
Their puzzle was that ‘The estimated range of the climate sensitivity to
CO2-doubling of 1.5°C–4.5°C has remained remarkably stable over two
decades, despite the huge growth of climate science’ (van der Sluijs et al.,
1998: 315). Their interpretation was that it was factors within the sociology
of this community that tended to make changes in the policy prescriptions
much less likely than continuity. Additionally, the estimate was broad
enough to admit of numerous different interpretations with little friction
among the scientific contributors, even if the estimate tacitly excluded
more catastrophic scenarios. Despite practitioners’ use of highly technical
models, sociological factors specific to this community seemed to influence
the knowledge it produced. This and other research (for example, that on
the ‘epistemic lifestyles’ spoken of by Simon Shackley: the choice between
‘best available model’ and ‘best available prediction’) are examples of
attempts by sociologists to examine the construction of climate knowledge
in an even-handed, symmetrical way. They lay out the choices available to
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actors and see what differences arise from the various ways those choices
could be (and have been) made. There is a great deal about the natural sci-
ence approaches adopted in climate science and climate modelling that can
be examined from this perspective.
As well as analysts who are interested in setting out the practicalities of
science under these new and challenging circumstances, there are also
those who use a similar approach with the intention of contesting climate
science. Sceptical critics (including the famous ones such as Bjørn
Lomborg [2001]) have had some success using a similar kind of focus.
Typically, they concentrate on topics such as the treatment of clouds and
of water vapour in trying to deconstruct the connection between the
build-up of CO2 and the resulting temperature increase.
The favourite examples in deconstructing climate models work in the
following way: the role of clouds in the Earth’s energy balance is known
to be important but, depending on the type of clouds and their location,
clouds may tend to reflect the sun’s heat or to cause insulation to be
increased. In other words, they may lessen or exacerbate climate change.
Clouds are difficult to model closely since they vary on a smaller scale
than that which models can handle. Thus cloud impacts are not directly
analysed in the principal models but are represented by general parame-
ters (see Lomborg, 2001: 270–3). Critics then suggest that the clouds are
treated by scientists worried about climate change in a way which implies
that clouds have been discovered to enhance the greenhouse effect; critics
contend that this is not a result of the model but the consequence of a deci-
sion made by the modellers when setting the parameters in the first place.
Water vapour features prominently also since it is a major greenhouse gas
and a source of potential positive feedbacks. It is feared that rising tem-
peratures will lead to more water vapour in the atmosphere, which, in
turn, will intensify warming. The amount of water vapour is linked to the
temperature not just of the Earth’s surface but of the lowest stratum of the
atmosphere. Lomborg claims that measurements of atmospheric temper-
ature do not easily fit the model’s assumptions since the surface warming
seems to be far ahead of the atmospheric warming. Potentially, therefore,
water vapour may not build up as rapidly as the models propose and thus
the temperature may not increase as anticipated. Lomborg suggests that
this mismatch between the models’ projections about water vapour and
direct measurements of the vapour is typically overlooked when assess-
ing the validity of the models.
I include these examples here not to endorse – nor indeed specifically
to query – Lomborg’s claims, but to indicate that the focus among those
interested in the construction of claims about climate change has tended
to be on the construction of natural scientific claims, mostly notably
claims arising from the climate models.
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Studying ‘Construction’ beyond the Natural
Science of Climate Science
I have argued that there are at least three senses in which knowledge
about climate change is uncontroversially constructed, and noted that
most of the sociological work and public controversy focuses only on the
first of these ways: the natural scientific construction. In the following sec-
tions, I propose to make the case for the importance of the other two
forms of construction: the construction of claims about societal responses
to climate change, and the construction of the social institutions within
which climate forecasts and projections circulate and are legitimated. In
brief, I suggest that the importance of these other forms can be demon-
strated through four distinct examples of construction that lie beyond the
realms of arguments over detailed natural science points:
• The issue of peer review;
• The issue of scientific judgement;
• The issue of economic valuations;
• The issue of the conceptualization of social science in climate modelling.
At the risk of pre-empting my own arguments, the links between these
four themes and the two forms of construction just outlined can be set out
as in Table 1.
In the following subsections I review each of these briefly.
Issue 1 – Peer Review
In the relationship between the IPCC – indeed the whole climate-change
regulation community – and its critics, not only the science but the vari-
ous ways in which the science is legitimated have come under attack
(see Lahsen, 2005a).
Critics have been quick to point to the supposed vested interests of this
community. Its access to money depends on the severity of the potential
harms that it warns about; hence – or so it has been argued – it inevitably
Table 1 Comparatively neglected forms of social science analysis of climate change
Forms of social scientific analysis Typical points of empirical focus
social science studies of the scientific analyse peer review
community that studies climate change study scientific judgement
social science reflection on the roles critically analyse the role of economic
of social science in climate-change models valuations
monitor the way social science features
in the models
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has a structural temptation to exaggerate those harms. This highlights one
of the outstanding features of the IPCC: though there have been other
mass scientific projects (including the human genome project), the IPCC
is unusual in that the science with which it had to deal was more contro-
versial and complex than the obvious comparators (see Nolin, 1999). With
the human genome, for instance, there was a high level of agreement
within the profession about what the answer should look like and no
organized lobby denying its basic premises. By contrast, the IPCC was
trying to offer policy relevant analyses that many other policy advisers,
including some respected scientists, were explicitly trying to junk.
As it was working in such a fraught and multidisciplinary area, the
IPCC attempted to extend its network widely enough so as to include all
the relevant scientific authorities; it was important that the IPCC should
not be dominated exclusively by meteorologists or atmospheric chemists.
But this meant that the IPCC ran into problems with peer reviewing and
perceived impartiality; there were virtually no ‘peers’ who were not
already within the IPCC (for an analysis of the accusations that could be
levelled on this basis, see Edwards and Schneider, 2001). Conventional
peer reviewing relies on there being few authors and many (more or less
disinterested) peers; the IPCC effectively reversed this situation. When
just one chapter in the 2001 Third Assessment Report has 10 lead authors
and over 140 contributing authors,2 then it is clear that this departs from
the standard notion of scientific knowledge production.
If challenged, the IPCC tended to fall back in line with the classic script
of ‘science for policy’ (see Yearley, 2005b: 160–2); the IPCC legitimated itself
in terms of the scientific objectivity and impartiality of its members. But
critics were able to point out that the scientific careers of the whole climate
change ‘orthodoxy’ depended on the correctness of the underlying assump-
tions. Worse, the IPCC and policy-makers largely selected who was in the
club of the qualified experts and thus threatened to be a self-perpetuating
community with a vested interest in continuing to find evidence for the
importance of the phenomenon to which its members’ careers were shack-
led (this line of attack is described in Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994: 198).
Arguments about peers and peer review may get even more complex and
self-referential. Thus, in 2004, US social studies of science scholar Naomi
Oreskes published an article in the leading journal Science: using bibliometric
techniques, she claimed to demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of
scientific articles published worldwide agreed on the reality of climate
change. The appearance of consensus was not, she implied, manufactured by
the IPCC but was genuinely global. In some contexts, her results passed as a
‘social fact’. Just as an example, Demeritt (2006: 453) writes that
‘Notwithstanding the robust scientific consensus to the contrary (Oreskes
2004), a small but vocal band of self-styled “climate sceptics” continues to
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deny the risks of anthropogenic climate change.’ He invokes Oreskes as
though she had documented an indisputably robust scientific consensus. But
the climate sceptics are equally interested in deconstructing Oreskes’ social
facts. There have been challenges to her methodology; for example on the
grounds that the climate-science papers used in her final sample from the lit-
erature were derived from a fairly limited set of bibliometric search terms;
different keywords could have produced a different result.3 But, aside from
any such specific counter-arguments, there is a logical difficulty with this
style of argument. To find that the people who publish in the mainstream lit-
erature are overwhelmingly in favour of the reality of climate change is not
self-evidently to prove that access to the literature is not skewed in favour of
those views. It is only when access to publishing opportunities is agreed to be
unbiased that one may assume that patterns of publication reflect underlying
attitudes; one cannot draw the inference in the opposite direction.
To conclude this subsection, let me repeat that I am not arguing against
the reality of climate change nor in favour of climate sceptics. I am not
even wanting to demur from Oreskes’ substantive assertion about what
the broad scientific consensus likely is. My point is more about the
process. The IPCC faces twin challenges: to include as wide an interdisci-
plinary community as possible in its work and yet to legitimate its views
in terms of the standard guarantors of scientific impartiality. These twin
demands inevitably drive peer review up against its very limits. The peer
review system is a socially constructed system and its suitability for new
jobs in new contexts is itself a matter for negotiation and demonstration.
Its suitability cannot be taken for granted.
Issue 2 – Scientific Judgement
The work of the IPCC is a collective work of judgement. Given the huge scale
of the IPCC and its novelty both as an institution and in terms of the phe-
nomena it tries to assess, a key issue was how it would reach judgements dis-
tilled from all the detail. The IPCC has to arrive at summary judgements and
these judgements – as van der Sluijs et al.’s (1998) study outlined above indi-
cates – are not narrowly determined by the vast array of scientific results in
the reports (see also van der Sluijs, 1997). It is clear that sociological and social
psychological considerations enter into the formulation of these judgements.
Moreover, the IPCC reports are characterized by a further level of judgement
since each report volume is introduced with a summary for policy-makers
(see, for example, Bruce et al., 1996) that has to be approved in detail by the
countries’ representatives; it is ‘thus an intergovernmentally negotiated text’ as
the Preface makes clear (Bruce et al., 1996: x; emphasis added).
The key social science issue here is an ironical one. Trends in the
philosophy and sociology of science over the last three decades have
tended to deny that there is any such thing as scientific method; this idea
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is helpfully expressed in Collins’ distinction between an enculturational
and an algorithmical view of scientific practice (Collins, 1992: 159–63). In
their work scientists do not follow an algorithm (such as Popper’s famous
idea of generating multiple hypotheses that are to be weeded out by deci-
sive falsifications); science cannot be automated. Rather, they learn a cul-
ture and become skilled at making judgements within that culture.
Though this overall argument has been very persuasive within the his-
tory of science and science studies, it has not led to as much detailed analy-
sis of scientific judgement as one might have expected. And, in particular,
by presenting all scientific practice as a matter of judgement, it has left
philosophers and sociologists of science with rather little to say about cases
of explicit judgement, as with the IPCC.
Consequently, there is still an ambivalence about judgement that leads
to similar problems to those detected around peer review. Given the
explicit role of expert judgement in presenting periodic assessments of the
state of the art in climate science – as the IPCC publications do – the report
authors cannot fall back on algorithm-like justifications for the war-
rantability of their views. However, to take the other route and to explic-
itly acknowledge that the reports are based on judgements opens them to
the charge that judgements have been made in tendentious ways or that
the reports are not compelling since a different set of authors might have
reached a different set of judgements about the conclusion. To avoid this
unattractive dilemma, an explicit acknowledgement of the role of judge-
ment is required. In courts and diplomacy sound judgement is admired.
The understanding of shrewd judgement in science can benefit from
studying these extra-scientific examples.
Issue 3 – The Role of Economic Valuations
The third detailed issue about the constructedness of climate knowledge
relates to the role and interpretation of economic factors within the IPCC
process. One specific and highly informative case here was the question of
the economic valuation of lives threatened by climatic change. In terms of
policy responses to global warming, there appear to be two broad possibili-
ties: either one tries to limit the build-up of greenhouse gases (by reducing
emissions or boosting sequestration and so on) or one takes steps to adapt to
a changed climate by building better sea defences, relocating homes, increas-
ing provision for cooling buildings and associated measures. In order to
work out a reasonable balance somewhere between ‘all abatement’ or ‘all
adaptation’, one needs to know the relative pros and cons. Both strategies
have costs and benefits, and economists working on the 1995 assessment
argued that one could not evaluate the various policy paths unless one had
a worldwide analysis of these advantages and costs. After one had com-
pleted such an analysis, one could then solve the equations to get a mix of
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policies that provided the greatest net benefit at lowest cost (see Fankhauser,
1995, and, for critical consideration, Demeritt and Rothman, 1999).
In short, they wanted to work out both the economic costs associated with
greenhouse gas abatements (direct costs and lost earnings opportunities) and
those associated with the adaptation route, including the price of the adapta-
tions themselves (such as sea defences) and the costs to people arising from
the changed climate (to which people were adapting). Among other things,4
this entailed putting a price on the typical life income of people from the var-
ious countries since some people would be victims whichever route was cho-
sen. And it turned out, for example, that each South Asian (many of whom
are likely to suffer from sea level rises) were calculated to ‘cost’ their country
much less than each westerner whose income might be lost. The economists
argued that they were not evaluating the worth of people’s lives, only putting
a price on the forgone earnings of typical individuals, but the procedure
appeared to value the life of a SouthAsian at about one-fifteenth of the worth
of a Northern citizen. The valuations were critical since the relative cheapness
of South Asians meant that the ‘rational’ global policy orientation was for
relatively little abatement (since that was costly as it tended to impact high-
earning Northerners) and a good deal of adaptation (mostly in the develop-
ing world); the adaptation appeared relatively inexpensive because it tended
to impact people with low incomes.
This line of reasoning, though retained in Chapter 6 of Volume III of the
1995 Assessment Report (see Pearce et al., 1996), was widely criticized
among NGOs (notably the Global Commons Institute, which was
founded precisely around this issue). In the end, the economistic argu-
ment was largely disavowed in the summary for policy-makers with
which the volume began. In the section on the social costs of humanly
caused climate change, the summary asserted that:
The literature on the subject of this section is controversial. . . . There is no con-
sensus about how to value statistical lives or how to aggregate statistical lives
across countries. Monetary valuation should not obscure the human conse-
quences of anthropogenic climate change damages, because the value of life
has meaning beyond monetary considerations. (Bruce et al., 1996: 9–10)
Within the one report there were two competing and incompatible
approaches to valuation. And while this revealed deep philosophical divi-
sions over the very conceptualization of the issues (O’Riordan and Jordan,
1999), the difference was not only philosophical since the way that one con-
strued the fundamental question of pricing dictated, in large measure, the
outcome of the policy review. The construction of the issue overwhelmingly
shaped the outcome.
This kind of explicit cost–benefit approach was much less in evidence in
later assessments. This prompted economics enthusiast Lomborg to
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lament that ‘it is regrettable that [such economic issues are] not rationally
assessed in the latest [i.e. the subsequent] report’ (Lomborg, 2001: 301). But
a measure of continuity with the rational pricing approach can be seen in
the recently published Stern Review (Stern, 2007), which again tries to
frame policy choices around a ‘neutral’ economic evaluation. This time
there was less deconstructive work from environmentalist authors since
Stern arrived at figures suggesting that climate change was well worth
addressing even in economic terms alone. It was not until the following
year that commentators such as George Monbiot (writing in The Guardian,
19 February 2008) engaged with the method by which the Stern Review
arrived at its conclusion.5 Monbiot finally sees that the method is ‘just’
cost–benefit calculation:
His report shows that the dollar losses of failing to prevent a high degree of
global warming outweigh the dollar savings arising from not taking action. It
therefore makes economic sense to try to stop runaway climate change. But
what if the result had been different? What if he had discovered that the prof-
its to be made from burning more fossil fuels exceeded the social cost of car-
bon? We would then find that it makes economic sense to kill people.
The only real surprise here is that Monbiot can muster any surprise and
indignation. Conceptually, the issue is identical to the conflict over the
1996 IPCC report.
Issue 4 – The Role of Social Science in Climate Models
The IPCC stood out from many other ‘science for policy’ organizations
through its commitment to include in its core activities the economic,
social scientific and policy aspects of its scientific theme. Though, accord-
ing to the self-understanding of the IPCC, these disciplines could not have
the precision and exactitude to which the physical sciences aspired, it was
clear that global climate change could not be studied in the absence of
societal analyses, for two reasons. On the one hand, the things that worry
us about climate change are chiefly the implications for people, com-
merce, cities and to some extent wildlife. The actual impacts that will arise
clearly depend on how people respond. Without expert advice on these
policy matters, there could be no sensible modelling of the ‘output’ side
of the climatologists’ work. On the other hand, possible policy responses
to climate change again depend on people’s willingness to accept the pol-
icy prescriptions – to forgo air travel or to put up with climate risks and
so on. The IPCC handled this issue by dividing its procedures into three
parallel tracks dealing with the physical sciences, the socioeconomic
impacts and possible policy responses.
The aspect of the ‘construction’ that is of particular interest here is the con-
struction of social science’s role. The IPCC’s involvement of social science is
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on the ‘downstream’ side, dealing with the consequences and impacts of
climate science. That the issue could be framed in a different way is indi-
cated by a four-volume work, edited by Rayner and Malone (1998), in which
social science scholars were invited to turn the question round. They were
invited to focus on the ‘climate impacts of global human change’, not only
on the ‘human impacts of global climate change’.
This innovative enterprise was clearly aimed to mirror the IPCC’s work
and to highlight the disciplinary orientations overlooked by the IPCC.
Alterations in greenhouse gas concentrations are largely due to emissions
from people and from their activities, and thus the rate of such atmospheric
change depends on the speed and nature of economic growth, people’s
reproductive behaviour and the size of future populations, the technologies
chosen by people, the cultures of consumption and leisure they develop
and so on. The institutional assumption of the IPCC is that the most rele-
vant social science is economics; many of the contributors to Rayner and
Malone focus on the centrality of culture and thus boost the potential role
for social anthropology and sociology, notably in understanding patterns of
consumption and the meanings that consumption holds.
My main argument here is not about the specific claims of the authors
in Rayner and Malone’s volumes; it is that there are clearly different views
on the explanatory primacy of the various disciplines needed to under-
stand global climate change. A key part of the way that climate science is
currently constructed is the nature of the role assigned to the social sci-
ences and to the implicit hierarchy among those sciences.
Concluding View
Fred Buttel – whose legacy is commemorated in this collection of articles –
wrote that, without denying the ability of science to capture how the
natural world operates:
. . . the crucial role of science often lies in how it is ‘represented’ and how it is
employed within social movements, interest groups, regulatory agencies, epis-
temic communities, international organizations and ‘regimes’, and so on.
Scientific knowledge thus often tends to be enmeshed with social symbols,
political ideologies and discourses, social movement ‘frames’. How this occurs
makes an enormous difference in terms of environmental policy and politics.
(Buttel, 2000: 28)
What I have argued in this article fits closely with this view.
However, it seems to me that Buttel’s comment also implicitly reflects
the majority practice, namely to concentrate on the role of natural scien-
tific knowledge in ‘environmental policy and politics’.
I hope to have shown that – at least in the case of climate change – the
important question of how knowledge is ‘represented’ applies with equal
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significance to social scientific and economics aspects of the knowledge
and also to the design and operation of the institutions through which sci-
entific knowledge is warranted in the first place. Climate change has
proven to be a major area for research in the sociology of science in the last
decade because of the complexity of the relationship between knowledge
and policy advising. Even so, it would only count as a highly complex
case study in the sociology of science were it not for two novel factors crit-
ical to sociological audiences. There is first the way in which the IPCC
process runs science-advising up against the very limits of legitimation
through peer review. Second, there is the fact that, through its own
deployment of social science, the IPCC inevitably raises a ‘reflexive’ ques-
tion about the role of the social sciences (see Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998).
Accordingly, I suggest that the conclusions of this article can be summed
up by returning to Table 1. Further research of many sorts on climate change
is clearly required, but two relatively neglected aspects deal with the social
science of climate change. As shown in the left-hand column, there is a need
for studies of the scientific community that studies climate change as well as
a need for more social science reflection on the roles of social science in cli-
mate-change models. In the table these broad types are linked to the exam-
ples discussed in this article earlier. I believe that a broadly constructionist
approach to climate-change knowledge pays dividends in alerting analysts
to the myriad and subtle roles that social scientific knowledge plays in diag-
nosing, forecasting and planning our climate futures.
Notes
1. For example, this was the lead story in the UK’s Guardian newspaper (20 June
2007); for details, see the MNP report, at: www.mnp.nl/en/dossiers/Climate
change/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition.html
(accessed 16 November 2008).
2. My example is Chapter 2, ‘Observed Climate Variability and Change’.
3. As an example, see ‘The Letter Science Magazine Refused to Publish’ (as though
that were unusual!); at: www.globalwarmingheartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=
19213 (accessed 16 November 2008).
4. As Demeritt and Rothman (1999: 392) point out, another key issue was the
‘discount rate’ used in assessing the ‘worth’ of future benefits/costs but my
chosen focus here is on other issues to do with ascribing values.
5. Monbiot starts his piece by suggesting that the Stern Review was so big that it
took most commentators a long while to read enough to appreciate its method-
ological basis; he reports that ‘by the time I reached the end I was horrified’.
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